INITIAL THOUGHTS ON CNO'S REPORT OF THE FITZGERALD AND MCCAIN COLLISIONS

I’ve read with great interest the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) report regarding the collisions of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John S McCain (DDG-56) with commercial merchant vessels. My expectation is that the United States Coast Guard (USCG) will publish a more detailed investigation through the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) when their work is complete. My hope is that enough of this report will be unclassified or otherwise not redacted so that the families of the fallen, as well as the public, might have some accurate answers.

To begin - the Bluejacket leadership in the berthing compartments of both ships needs to be noticed, commended, and VALUED at the highest levels. Ships’ Company fought to save their ships, and their shipmates, in several cases at the cost of their own lives. These people truly performed “in the best tradition of the Naval Service”, and it is my hope that in hurrying to put these two affairs behind us, we don’t forget their sacrifice.

I will confine my navigation, watch standing, and ship handling remarks to some limited comments. First, a caveat that everything that follows is from my understanding of the CNO’s report. Nothing in this blog should be taken as impugning or slighting any individual or group.

What jumps out at me, of course is the speed. Fitzgerald maintained twenty knots (23.016 miles per hour, or 37.04 kilometres per hour) up until the collision, never slackening speed even when in extremis.

 

 

 

 

CNO did not put any sort of scale on the graphic, however we can approximate quite handily from the time series provided. If Fitzgerald was at twenty knots, then she moved approximately 10,000 yards (5 nautical miles (n.m.)) between 0105 and 0120 (20 knots x .25 hours). This puts her about seven miles offshore heading perpendicularly into a Vessel Traffic Separation Scheme (VTSS) with multiple vessels close aboard at night.

At 0000, two vessels were within 3 n.m. No course and speed determinations were made, and the Commanding Officer (CO) was not notified.

 

0015 Two more vessels passed within 3 n.m. No course and speed determinations were made, and the CO was not notified.

0034 Fitzgerald passed four vessels down the port side at 1,500 yards. The CO was informed of these, however radar contact was not held on any of these vessels. To reiterate, the surface search radar did not detect contacts at ¾ of a mile, in calm seas, held visually. This appears not to have been a cause for concern.

0108 Fitzgerald “crossed the bow of a ship at approximately 650 yards”, passed a second ship at 2 n.m., and a third at 2.5 miles. The CO was again not informed. Note that at twenty knots relative speed (with the other vessel standing still), Fitzgerald was covering 667 yards per minute over ground ((20 knots x 2,000 yards) / 60).

0127 Fitzgerald’s Officer of the Deck (OOD) orders a starboard turn to 240, and rescinds the order within a minute, ordering a full bell and hard left rudder to avoid the imminent crossing situation with ACX Crystal.

0129 The rudder and lee helm orders had not been carried out. The Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch (BMOW) took the helm and executed the OOD’s orders.

0130 Collision. I would propose that if the OOD had stayed with the original plan (turning toward the danger, rather than away), he would have executed a port to port passage on ACX Crystal (albeit close aboard). I further understand this would have put Fitzgerald into a potential situation with Wan Hai, as well as several unidentified contacts, but the point would have been to buy time to get the ship slowed and reacquire situational awareness.

With regard to the McCain collision, it seems to boil down to having augmented watch standers from USS Antietam (CG-54) who were unfamiliar with McCain’s installed helm and lee helm stations. In this case, the CO was on the bridge. McCain passed the Alnic MC, and due to a combination of errors, put on 33 degrees of left rudder, and split the throttles, making turns for twenty knots on the starboard shaft while the port shaft was slowed to 5 knots. She cut in front of the Alnic MC, close aboard, and the collision ensued before rudder and helm corrections could be effectually employed.

The initial suggestions I would offer would be the wholesale adoption of Bridge Resource Management (BRM), which comes from aviation’s Cockpit Resource Management (CRM). If you have a degraded sensor, you figure out (in advance) how you’re going to compensate, or indeed if compensation is possible. In the case of Fitzgerald, an affirmative compensation for radar issues might have consisted of moving a bit further offshore, out of the coastwise traffic and fishing fleet, and slowing down. In McCain’s case, reviewing the Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill to ensure that anyone learning “on the job” (OJT) has a qualified watch stander with him or her at all times may have prevented this tragedy.