Interesting Read for People Interested in Strategy, Tactics,
& Logistics
I was listening to a podcast from the PritzkerMilitary Museum and Library last Friday.
Mr. James Holland was giving a talk on his new book,
The Allies Strike Back,
1941-1943: The War in the West, Volume 2.
His book sounds fascinating, and based on his talk
alone, I’d recommend it to anyone interested in World War II. In the course of Mr.
Holland’s question and answer discourse, he mentioned a publication that I
downloaded and read.
German Tank Maintenance in World War II, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-202, June 1954, was written by
Generalleutnant Burkhart
Müller-Hillebrand (1904 – 1987), who served from 1923 to 1965 in the Reichswehr,
Wehrmacht, and Bundeswehr, respectively.
Without going into a full book
report, I’ve paraphrased some of General
Müller’s
observations below.
I.
Logistics systems and organizations
generally work well when they are not operated to capacity and beyond. This can
lead to complacency and a misplaced sense of hubris.
II.
Centralized systems are subject to vagaries
of time and distance. Ownership of issues decreases proportionately to distance
from operations. German mechanics worked around the clock on the Eastern front,
but at depot level in Germany, there was no similar rush to complete work ahead
of a production schedule created without regard to tactical (unit level)
considerations.
III.
High speed interior lines of
communications between supply points, maintenance facilities, and front-line
units are critical. Time is the essential element at play.
IV.
Decentralization of mission critical
logistics functions can obviate some weakness in interior lines of
communications through the use of intermediate-level activities and regional warehousing.
There must still be an uninterrupted supply of mission critical supplies in-transit.
V.
Spare part supply and re-supply chains
must be thought out prior to operations. Ad
hoc solutions will generally be found wanting.
VI.
From a budgetary standpoint, it is
easier to get “new tanks” approved than “parts for existing tanks”. Once
operations have commenced, out of sheer frustration, maintenance personnel will
put repairable tanks on the deadline and strip them of parts to fix other tanks.
This almost invariably results in the constructive loss of the stripped tank
(or F/A-18), as it will never be rebuilt.
VII.
During the summer offensive of 1942, 75%
of total German tanks were employed in the southern part of the Russian theatre.
Within a short time, hundreds of tanks were disabled for want of spare
parts. Only 30% of these tanks required welding or complex repairs.
VIII.
In the autumn of 1942, the new Tiger (Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausführung H) was deployed in Russia. One spare engine and one
spare transmission were produced for every ten tanks manufactured. Almost all
Tigers were shortly lost or deadlined due to a lack of spare parts.
IX.
The number of different models
of equipment in any theater must be kept to a minimum. If a tank regiment has
three basic models of tank, each of which has three or four possible
modifications, maintenance, spare parts, and resupply systems cannot function
properly. In the German eastern front experience, seven of ten repair jobs involved
only the replacement of parts.
The United States Army put together these books in the form of "lessons learned" from the enemy's viewpoint. While important (and still informative) as written from a military perspective, I suggest that some of these observations apply to any form of endeavor in which materials are transported over distances on a continuing basis.
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